On the Primacy of the Common Good
FOOTNOTES

1 Karl Marx, Morceaux choisis, ed. N.R.F., p. 37.

2 "... quia videntes dignitatem suam, appetierunt singularitatem, quae maxime est propria superborum ... (recusat diabolus beatitudinem supernaturalem) habere sine singularitate propria, sed communem cum hominibus; ex quo consecutum est quod voluerit specialem super eos habere praelationem potius quam communicationem, ut etiam Divus Thomas fatetur in hac quaestione I, XIII, n. 3, in calce. Accedit ad hoc auctoritas S. Gregorii papae, ... 'Angelos perdidisse participatam celsitudinem, quia privatam desideraverunt', id est, recusarunt caelestem beatitudinem, quia participata et communis erat multis et solum voluerunt privatam, scilicet quatenus privatam, et propriam, quia prout sic habebat duas conditiones maxime opportunas superbiae, scilicet singularitatem, seu nihil commune habere cum inferioribus, quod ipsis vulgare videbatur, etiamsi esset gloria supernaturalis, et non habere illam ex speciali beneficio, et gratia et quasi precario: hoc enim maxime recusant superbi, et maxime recusavit Angelus. Et ad hoc pertinet parabola illa Lucae XIV, de homine qui fecit coenam magnam, et vocavit multos, et cum vocasset invitatos coeperunt se excusare: ideo enim fortassis recusaverunt ad illam coenam venire, quia magna erat, et pro multis, dedignantes consortium habere cum tanto numero, potiusque eligerunt suas privatas commoditates, licet longe inferiores, utpote naturalis ordinis, iste quia villam emit, ille quia juga boum, alius quia uxorem duxerat, unusquisque propriam excusationem praetendens, et privatum bonum, quia proprium, recusans vero coenam, quia magnam, et multis communem. Iste est propriissime spiritus superbiae." John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol. ed. Vives, V. IV, d. 23, n. 3, nn. 34-5 pp. 950-1. "... quia suam naturam, et propriam excellentiam judicabat non haberi ex speciali gratia, et beneficio Dei, sed jure creationis, nec ut multis communem, sed sibi singularem..." ibid., n. 40, p. 955.--"Angelus in primo suo peccato inordinate diligens bonum spirituale nempe suum proprium esse, suamque propriam perfectionem, sive beatitudinem naturalem ... ita voluit, ut simul ex parte modi volendi, quamvis non ex parte rei volitae, per se voluerit aversionem a Deo, et non subjici ejus regulae in prosecutione suae celsitudinis..." Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., ed. Palme, V. IV, d. 10, dub. 1, p. 559b.

3 S. Thomas, IIIa Pars, q. 8, n. 7, c.

4 John of S. Thomas, loc. cit., n. 39, p. 954.

5 "... quanto aliqua causa est altior, tanto ejus causalitas ad plura se extendit. Habet enim causa altior proprium causatum altius quod est communius et in pluribus inventum." S. Thomas, In VI Metaph., Lect. 3, n. 1205.

6 "Manifestum est enim, quod unaquaeque causa tanto prior est et potior quanto ad plura se extendit. Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo, si idem bonum est uni homini et toti civitati: multo videtur majus et perfectius suscipere, idest procurare et salvare illud quod est bonum totius civitatis, quam id quod est bonum unius hominis. Pertinet quidem ad amorem, qui debet esse inter homines, quod homo conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini. Sed multo melius et divinius est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti et civitatibus. Vel aliquando amabile quidem est quod exhibeatur uni soli civitati, sed multo divinius est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti, in qua multae civitates continentur. Dicitur hoc autem esse divinius, eo quod magis pertinet ad Dei similitudinem, qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum. Hoc autem bonum, scilicet quod est commune uni vel pluribus civitatibus, intendit methodus, idest quaedam ars, quae vocatur civilis. Unde ad ipsam maxime pertinet considerare finem ultimum humanae vitae: tamquam ad principalissimam." In I Ethic., Lect. 2, n. 30. --Compare this text to the following passage from Lorenzo Valla's De Voluptate, in which he replies to the question An moriendum sit pro aliis (L. II, c. 2): "I have no obligation whatever to die for a citizen, nor for two, nor for three, and so on to infinity. How could I be obliged to die for the fatherland, which is the sum of all of the latter? Will the fact of adding one more change the quality of my obligation?" Apud P. Monnier, Le Quattrocento, 8th ed., Paris, 1924, Vol. I, p. 46. "Humanists," Cino Rinuccini says, "understand nothing about domestic economy. They live foolishly without concern for paternal honor or the good of children. They do not know what government is the best, that of one or of many, or that of many or of few. They flee from fatigue, affirm that what serves the common serves no one, do not defend the Republic as a guarnaca, and do not defend it with arms. And lastly they forget that the more a good is common, the more it is divine. (Ne si ricordano che quanto il bene e piu comune, tanto a piu del divino.)" Ibid., p. 332.

7 III Contra Gentiles, c. 24:

Bonum suum cujuslibet rei potest accipi multipliciter:

Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est eius proprium ratione individui. Et sic appetit animal suum bonum cum appetit cibum, quo in esse conservatur.

Alio modo, secundum quod est eius ratione speciei. Et sic appetit proprium bonum animal inquantum appetit generationem prolis et eius nutritionem, vel quicquid aliud operatur ad conservationem vel defensionem individuorum suae speciei.

Tertio vero modo, ratione generis. Et sic appetit proprium bonum in causando agens aequivocum: sicut caelum.

Quarto autem modo, ratione similitudinis analogiae principiatorum ad suum principium. Et sic Deus, qui est extra genus, propter suum bonum omnibus rebus dat esse.

8 "(Quodlibet singulare naturaliter diligit plus bonum suae speciei quam bonum suum singulare." Ia, q. 60, n. 6, ad 1.

9 "Nec obstat fundamentum P. Suarez, quia videlicet nutritio ordinatur ad propriam conservationem in se, generatio autem in alieno individuo; magis autem inclinatur unumquodque in bonum proprium quam in alienum, quia amicabilia ad alterum oriuntur ex amicabilibus ad se. Respondetur enim, inclinatur aliquid magis in bonum proprium, ut distinguitur contra alienum, non contra bonum commune. Ad hoc enim major est ponderatio quam ad proprium, quia etiam proprium continetur sub communi et ab eo dependet, et sic amicabilia ad alterum oriuntur ex amicabilibus ad se, quando est alterum omnino alienum, non quando est alterum quasi bonum commune et superius, respectu cujus haec maxima non currit." John of St. Thomas, Curs. Phil., V. III, (Reiser), p. 87a.

10 "... natura reflectitur in seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune: inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem. Et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter." Ia, q. 60, a. 5, ad 3.

11 III Contra Gentiles, c. 112.

12 Q. D. de Veritate, q. 2, a. 2, c.

13 "Quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis et eminentius in gradu bonitatis, tanto appetitum boni communiorem habet et magis in distantibus a se bonum quaerit et operatur. Nam imperfecta ad solum bonum proprii individui tendunt; perfecta vero ad bonum speciei; perfectora vero ad bonum generis; Deus autem, qui est perfectissimus in bonitate, ad bonum totius entis. Unde non immerito dicitur a quibusdam quod bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, est diffusivum: quia quanto aliquid invenitur melius, tanto ad remotiora bonitatem suam diffundit. Et quia in quolibet genere quod est perfectissimum est exemplar et mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis, oportet quod Deus qui est in bonitate perfectissimus et suum bonitatem commissime diffundens, in sua diffusione sit exemplar omnium bonitatem diffundentium." III Contra Gentiles, c. 24.

14 "Cum affectio sequatur cognitionem, quanto cognitio est universalior, tanto affectio eam sequens magis respecit bonum commune; et quanto cognitio est magis particularis, tanto affectio ipsam sequens magis respicit privatum bonum; unde et in nobis privata dilectio ex cognitione sensitiva exoritur; dilectio vero communis et absoluti boni ex cognitione intellectiva. Quia ergo angeli quanto sunt altiores, tanto habent scientiam magis universalem ... , ideo eorum dilectio maxime respicit commune bonum. Q. D. de Spir. creat., n. 8, ad 5.

15 "Magis ergo diligunt se invicem, si specie differunt, quod magis pertinet ad perfectionem universi ... quam si specie convenirent, quod pertineret ad bonum privatum unius speciei.

16 XII Metaph., c. 10, 1075a5.

17 "As long as men are in natural society, as long as consequently there is a divergence between the particular and the general interest, as long therefore as activity is not divided voluntarily but rather naturally, the proper task of man becomes for him an alien and hostile force, which subjugates him rather than being dominated by him. As soon as, in particular, the division of labor begins, each person has a definite and exclusive sphere of activity, which is imposed and from which one cannot escape; one is a hunter, a fisher, a pastor or a critic and must remain so, if one does not want to lose the means of existence; whereas in communist society, in which each person does not have an exclusive sphere of activity, but can develop himself in any branch he pleases, society rules general production, and thus permits me to do one thing today and another tomorrow...." Marx, Morceaux choisis, N.R.F. edition, p. 203.

18 "Amare bonum alicujus civitatis ut habeatur et possideantur, non facit bonum politicum; quia sic etiam aliquis tyrannus amat bonum alicujus civitatis ut ei dominetur; quod est amare seipsum magis quam civitatem; sibi enim ipsi hoc bonum concupiscit, non civitati. Sed amare bonum civitatis ut conservetur et defendatur, hoc est vere amare civitatem; quod bonum politicum facit, in tantum quod aliqui propter bonum civitatis conservandum vel ampliandum, se periculis mortis exponant et negligant privatum bonum. Sic igitur amare bonum quod a beatis participatur ut habeatur vel possideatur, non facit hominem bene se habentem ad beatitudinem, quia etiam mali illud bonum concupiscunt; sed amare illud bonum secundum se, ut permaneat et diffundatur, et ut nihil contra illud bonum agatur, hoc facit hominem bene se habentem ad illam societatem beatorum; et haec est caritas, quae Deum per se diligit, et proximos qui sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut seipsos." Q. D. de Carit., a. 2, c.

19 "... sic enim et populus totus erit quasi unus tyrannus. de Regno. c. 1.

20 "Proprium autem bonum hominis oportet diversimode accipi, secundum quod homo diversimode accipitur. Nam, proprium bonum hominis inquantum homo, est bonum rationis eo quod homini esse est rationale esse. Bonum autem hominis secundum quod est artifex, est bonum artis, et sic etiam secundum quod est politicus, est bonum ejus bonum commune civitatis." Q. D. de Carit., a. 2, c.

21 "... ad hoc quod aliquis sit bonus politicus, requiritur quod amat bonum civitatis. Si autem homo, inquantum admittitur ad participandum bonum alicujus civitatis, et efficitur civis alicujus civitatis, competunt ei virtutes quaedam ad operandum ea quae sunt civium et ad amandum bonum civitatis, ita cum homo per divinam gratiam admittitur in participationem coelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione et fruitione consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae vocatur coelestis Jerusalem secundum illud Ephes. II, 19: Estis cives sanctorum et domestici Dei." Ibid.

22 "Unde homini sic ad caelestiam adscripto, competunt quaedam virtutes gratuitae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, ad quarum debitum operationem praeexigitur amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum divinum, prout est beatitudinis objectum. Ibid.

23 "... cum nullum meritum sit sine caritate, actus virtutis acquisitae non potest esse meritorius sine caritate.... Nam virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem non facit actum ordinatum ad finem superiorem, nisi mediante virtute superiori: sicut fortitudo, quae est virtus hominis qua homo, non ordinat actum suum ad bonum politicum, nisi mediante fortitudine quae est virtus hominis in quantum est civis." Q. D. de Virtut., a. 10, ad 4.--"Dicit ergo primo (Philosophus), quod neque etiam fortitudo est circa mortem quam aliquis sustinet in quocumque casu vel negotio, sicut in mari vel in aegritudine; sed circa mortem quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut contingit cum aliquis moritur in bello propter patriae defensionem ... quia mors quae est in bello est in maximo periculo, quia de facili ibi moritur homo; etiam est in periculo optimo, quia homo pericula sustinet hic propter bonum commune, quod est optimum.... Virtus autem est circa maximum et optimum...." In III Ethic. lect. 14, nn. 537-8.

24 "... eminentem obtinebunt coelestis beatitudinis gradum, qui officium regium digne et laudabiliter exequuntur. Si enim beatitudo virtutis est praemium, consequens est ut majori virtuti major gradus beatitudinis debeatur. Est autem praecipua virtus qua homo aliquis non solum seipsum, sed etiam alios dirigere potest; et tanto magis, quanto plurium est regitiva; quia et secundum virtutem corporalem tanto aliquis virtuosior reputatur, quanto plures vincere potest, aut pondera levare. Sic igitur major virtus requiritur ad regendum domesticam familiam quam ad regendum seipsum, multoque major ad regimen civitatis et regni.... Tanto autem est aliquid Deo acceptius, quanto magis ad ejus imitationem accedit: unde et Apostolus monet Ephes. V, 1: Estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi. Sed si secundum Sapientis sententiam: Omne animal diligit simile sibi, secundum quod causae aliqualiter similitudinem habent causati, consequens igitur est bonos reges Deo esse acceptissimos, et ab eo maxime praemiandos." de Regno, c. 9.

25 "... cum amor respiciat bonum, secundum diversitatem boni est diversitas amoris. Est autem quoddam bonum proprium alicujus hominis in quantum est singularis persona; et quantum ad dilectionem respicientem hoc bonum, unusquisque est sibi principale objectum dilectionis. Est autem quoddam bonum commune quod pertinet ad hunc vel ad illum inquantum est pars alicujus totius, sicut ad militem inquantum est pars exercitus, et ad civem, inquantum est pars civitatis; et quantum ad dilectionem respicientem hoc bonum, principale objectum dilectionis est illud in quo principaliter illud bonum consistit, sicut bonum exercitus in duce, et bonum civitatis in rege; unde ad officium boni militis pertinet ut etiam salutem suam negligat ad conservandum bonum ducis, sicut etiam homo naturaliter ad conservandum caput, brachium exponit; ..." Q. D. de Carit., a. 4. ad 2.

26 "... et hoc modo caritas respicit sicut principale objectum, bonum divinum, quod pertinet ad unumquemque, secundum quod esse potest particeps beatitudinis." Ibid.

27 "... bonitas cujuslibet partis consideratur in proportione ad suum totum: unde et Augustinus dicit ... quod turpis est omnis pars quae suo toti non congruit. Cum igitur quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi; nec totum potest bene existere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis." Ia-IIae, q. 92. a. 1, ad 3.

28 "Primo quidem, quia bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiae vel civitatis aut regni. Unde et Maximus Valerius dicit de antiquis Romanis quod malebant esse pauperes in divite imperio quam divites in paupere imperio.--Secundo quia, cum homo sit pars domus et civitatis, oportet quod homo consideret quid sit sibi bonum ex hoc quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis: bona enim dispositio partis accipitur secundum habitudinem ad totum; quia ut Augustinus dicit ... turpis est omnis pars suo toti non congruens." IIa-IIae, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.

29 Q. D. de Carit., a. 2, c.

30 "Actus ... rationalis creaturae a divina providentia diriguntur, non solum ea ratione quo ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam in quantum sunt personales actus." III Contra Gentiles, c. 113.

31 "Unumquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo quod est propinquius fini ultimo: quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi: cum ad ipsum ordinetur sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum hujus vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi." III Contra Gentiles, c. 64.

32 "Distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam; et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas; ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim; unde perfectius participant divinum bonitatem, et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura." Ia, q. 47, a. 1, c.

33 "In quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi.... Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium ... Sed ... ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso...". Ia, q. 15, n. 2, c.

34 "Id quod est bonum et optimum in effectu, est finis productionis ipsius. Sed bonum et optimum universi consistit in ordine partium ipsius ad invicem, qui sine distinctione esse non potest; per hunc enim ordinem universum in sua totalitate constituitur, quae est optimum ipsius. Ipse igitur ordo partium universi et distinctio earum est finis productionis universi." III Contra Gentiles, c. 39.

35 IIIa, q. 8, a. 7, c.

36 See Appendix I, p. 103.

37 "Manifestum est enim quod duplex est bonum universi: quoddam separatum, scilicet Deus, qui est sicut dux in exercitu; et quoddam in ipsis rebus, et hoc est ordo partium universi, sicut ordo partium exercitus est bonum exercitus. Unde Apostolus dicit Rom. XIII, 1: Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Oportet autem quod superiores universi partes magis de bono universi participent, quod est ordo. Perfectius autem participant ordinem ea in quibus est ordo per se, quam ea in quibus est ordo per accidens tantum." Q. D. de Spir. creat., n. 8, c.

38 Ia, q. 47, n. 2.

39 "Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsae ulterius non referantur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsas, quia bona quae propter divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem; quae vero aliis dantur, in earum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt." III Contra Gentiles, c. 112.

40 In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

41 In I Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4.

42 III Contra Gentiles, c. 113.

43 "Praecellunt enim (intellectuales et rationales naturae) alias creaturas et in perfectione naturae et in dignitate finis. In perfectione quidem naturae, quia sola creatura rationalis habet dominium sui actus, libere se agens ad operandum; dum caeterae vero creaturae ad opera propria magis aguntur quam agant... In dignitate autem finis, quia sola creatura intellectualis ad ipsum finem ultimum universi sua operatione pertingit, scilicet cognoscendo et amando Deum: aliae vero creaturae ad finem ultimum pertingere non possunt nisi per aliqualem similitudinis ipsius participationem." Ibid., c. 111.

44 "... homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit; et ideo decidit a dignitate humana, prout scilicet homo est naturaliter liber, et propter seipsum existens, et incidit quodammodo in servitutem bestiarum... Pejor enim est malus homo quam bestia ..." Ia-IIa, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3.

45 "Paternitas igitur est dignitas Patris, sicut et essentia Patris: nam dignitas absolutum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Sicut igitur eadem essentia quae in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio; ita eadem dignitas quae in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio."Ia, q. 42, a. 4, ad 2.

46 "Sicut etiam subsistentia, quando est modus proprius, subordinatur naturae: subsistentia vero divina, assumens naturam creatam terminando, potius subordinat illam sibi." John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., Solesmes, V. 11, p. 159, n. 12.

47 "... sicut est ordo in causis agentibus, ita etiam in causis finalibus: ut scilicet secundarius finis a principali dependeat sicut secundarium agens a principali dependet. Accidit autem peccatum in causis agentibus quando secundarium agens exit ab ordine principalis agentis: sicut, cum tibia deficit propter suam curvitatem ab executione motus quem virtus appetitiva imperebat, sequitur claudicatio. Sic igitur et in causis finalibus, cum finis secundarius non continetur sub ordine principalis finis, est peccatum voluntatis, cujus objectum est bonum et finis.--Quaelibet autem voluntas naturaliter vult illud quod est proprium volentis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse perfectum, nec potest contrarium hujus velle. In illo igitur volente nullum potest voluntatis peccatum accidere cujus proprium bonum est ultimus finis, quod non continetur sub alterius finis ordine, sed sub ejus ordine omnes alii fines continentur. Huiusmodi autem volens est Deus, cujus esse est summa bonitas, quae est ultimus finis. In Deo igitur peccatum voluntatis esse non potest.--In quocumque autem alio volente, cujus proprium bonum necesse est sub ordine alterius boni contineri, potest peccatum accidere voluntatis, si in sua natura consideratur. Licet enim naturalis inclinatio voluntatis insit unicuique volenti ad volendum et amandum sui ipsius perfectionem, ita quod contrarium hujus velle non possit; non tamen sic est inditum ei naturaliter ut ita ordinet suam perfectionem in alium finem quod ab eo deficere non possit: cum finis superior non sit suae naturae proprius, sed superioris naturae. Relinquitur igitur suo arbitrio quod propriam perfectionem in superiorem ordinet finem. In hoc enim differunt voluntatem habentia ab his quae voluntate carent, quod habentia voluntatem ordinant se et sua in finem, unde et liberi arbitrii esse dicuntur: quae autem voluntate carent, non ordinant se in finem, sed ordinantur a superiori agente, quasi ab alio acta in finem, non autem a seipsis. III Contra Gentes., c. 109.

48 "Hoc autem differt inter hominem et substantiam separatam, quod in uno homine sunt plures appetitivae virtutes, quarum una sub altera ordinatur. Quod quidem in substantiis separatis non contingit: una tamen earum est sub altera. Peccatum autem in voluntate contingit qualitercumque appetitus inferior deflectatur. Sicut igitur peccatum in substantiis separatis esset vel per hoc quod deflecteretur ab ordine divino, vel per hoc quod aliqua earum inferior deflecteretur ab ordine alicujus superioris sub ordine divino manentis, ita in homine uno contingit peccatum dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod volultas humana bonum proprium non ordinat in Deum: quod quidem peccatum est commune et sibi et substantiae separatae. Alio modo, per hoc quod bonum inferioris appetitus non regulatur secundum superiorem: puta quando delectabilia carnis, in quae concupiscibilis tendit, volumus non secundum ordinem rationis. Hujusmodi autem peccatum non contingit in substantiis separatis esse." Ibid.

49 "Considerandum est etiam quod, cum proprium alicujus bonum habet ordinem ad plura superiora, liberum est volenti ut ab ordine alicuius superiorum recedat et alterius ordinem non derelinquat, sive sit superior sive inferior." Ibid.

50 "Sicut miles, qui ordinatur sub rege et sub duce exercitus, potest voluntatem suam ordinare in bonum ducis et non regis aut e converso. Sed si dux ab ordine regis recedat, bona erit voluntas militis recedentis a voluntate ducis et dirigentis voluntatem suam in regem, mala autem voluntas militis sequentis voluntatem ducis contra voluntatem regis: ordo enim inferioris principii dependet ab ordine superioris. Ibid.

51 "Quamvis igitur multa, quae videntur esse per accidens reducendo ipsa ad causas particulares, inveniantur non esse per accidens reducendo ipsa ad causam communem universalem scilicet virtutem caelestem, tamen etiam hac reductione facta inveniuntur aliqua esse per accidens...." In VI Metaph., Lect. 3. n. 1212.

52 "... manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; puta si aliquis alteri dicat, Volo hoc addiscere, Volo hoc vel illud facere. Cujus ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux, nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem: unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum hujusmodi, non est illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere: sed solum quid rei veritas se habeat." Ia, q. 107, a. 2, c.

53 "Per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter, per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid... Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi; unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter, quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habent aliquam perfectionem, in quantum est actu non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter sed secundum quid." Ia, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

54 "Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cujus est, quam in seipsum. Et haec inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quae naturaliter aguntur: quia unumquodque, sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum natum est agi, ut dicitur in II Physic. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, hujusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars hujus civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis." Ia, q. 60, a. 5, c.

55 "... Natura et substantia partis, hoc ipsum quod est, essentialiter et primo propter totum et totius esse est. Quod convenire cuilibet creaturae respectu Dei, patet. Quia quaelibet creatura, secundum suam naturam, est naturalis pars universi: ac per hoc naturaliter diligit plus universum quam seipsam, juxta primum fundamentum. Ergo, a fortiori, magis diliget ipsum bonum universale: tum quia est eminentius totum universum: tum quia est omne bonum; tum quia bonum ipse universale quod est Deus gloriosus, est finis et bonum ipsius universi, et consequenter a quocumque magis amatur universum, ab eo magis amabitur ipse, ut patet de exercitu et duce juxta doctrinam XII Metaph. (c. 10)." Cajetan, ibid., n. 5.--Also, In III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, c.

56 See Appendix II, p. 106.

57 "... bonum totius diligit quidem pars secundum quod est sibi conveniens: non autem ita quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod seipsam refert in bonum totius." IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3. ad 2.

58 "Dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum quod est objectum amicitiae invenitur secundum aliquem particularem modum: non autem de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum praedictum invenitur secundum rationem totius." Ibid., ad 1. See also the commentary of Cajetan.

59 Ia, q. 60, a. 5, c.

60 "... felicitas est operatio hominis secundum intellectum. In intellectu autem est considerare speculativum cujus finis est cognitio veritatis, et practicum cujus finis est operatio. Et secundum hoc duplex felicitas assignatur hominis. Una speculativa quae est operatio hominis secundum virtutem perfectam contemplativam quae est sapientia. Alia autem practica quae est perfectio hominis secundum perfectam virtutem hominis practicam quae est prudentia. Est autem quaedam operationem secundum prudentiam et speculatio secundum sapientiam hominis secundum seipsum solum. Et est quaedam operatio prudentiae et speculatio totius civitatis; et ideo est quaedam felicitas practica et speculativa quaedam hominis secundum seipsum, et est quaedam felicitas practica totius civitatis et quaedam contemplativa totius civitatis. Felicitas autem speculativa secundum unum hominem melior est practica quae est secundum unum hominem, sicut evidenter docet Aristoteles in X Ethicorum; quoniam illa perfectio intellectus eligibilior est quae est respectu objecti magis intelligibilis, quia ratio perfectionis sumitur ex objecto; talis autem est speculativa. Felicitas enim est perfectio intellectus respectu primi et maxime intelligibilis. Felicitas autem practica est perfectio intellectus respectu agibilis ab homine quod multo deficit a ratione intelligibilis primi, ergo felicitas contemplativa unius eligibilior est quam felicitas practica; et iterum magis est continua et sufficiens et delectabilis haec quam illa. Et eadem ratione contemplativa totius civitatis eligibilior est quam politica seu civilis, et contemplativa totius civitatis simpliciter eligibilior est contemplativa quae est secundum unum; similiter civilis practica quae est secundum unum. Et hoc est quod intendebat dicere Aristoteles I Ethicorum: si idem est uni et civitati, majusque et perfectius quod civitati videtur et suscipere et salvare. Amabile enim et uni: melius vero et divinius genti et civitati. Et ratio hujus potest esse, quia contemplativa et civilis civitatis comparantur ad contemplativam secundum unum, sicut totum ad partem: totum autem rationem magis perfecti et majoris boni habet quam pars, et ideo ista quam illa." In VII Politic., lect. 2. (P. de Alvernia complevit.)

61 "... bonum gratiae unius majus est quam bonum naturae totius universi." Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2.

62 M. H. Doms, the author of a very well distributed work, Du sens et de la fin du mariage (Desclee de Brouwer), in which he maintains with regard to this great sacrament a personalist conception and a profoundly perverse one, wishes to hold the contrary, and bases himself on Scheeben (pp. 28-32; 69). St. Augustine and St. Thomas explicitly reject this doctrine. De Trinitate, Book XII, Ch. 5; Ia, q. 93, a. 6. Read also, concerning marriage and against its mystical meaning, Cornelius Lapidus, In Epistolam ad Ephesios, ch. 5, verse 32; Dennis the Carthusian, Enarratio in Canticum Canticorum, a. 2. It has become most urgent to spread the writings of St. Augustine against the Pelagian exaltation of man and of liberty, as well as his writings on marriage.

63 "Cum dicitur quod Deus diligitur ab Angelo inquantum est ei bonus, si ly inquantum dicat finem, sic falsum est: non enim diligit naturaliter Deum propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum Deum. Si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amantis, sic verum est: non enim esset in natura alicujus quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus. Ia IIa, q. 60. a. 5. ad 2.

64 "... homo non ordinatur ad societatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua ..." Ia IIae, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3.

65 "At Deus pari modo hominem ad civilem consortionem natum conformatumque voluit, quam profecto sua ipsius natura postulat. Societas enim ex divini Creatoris consilio naturale praesidium est, quo quilibet civis possit ac debeat ad propositam sibi metam assequendam uti; quandoquidem Civitas homini non homo Civitati existit. Id tamen non ita intelligendum est, quemadmodum ob suam individualismi doctrinam Liberales, quos vocant, asseverant; qui quidem communitatem immoderatis singulorum commodis inservire jubent: ..." Divini Redemptoris, Acta Apost. Sedis, 31 martii 1937, p. 79.

66 See above p. 27, n. 23.

67 It is true that in the lower animals knowledge is subordinated to something inferior to knowledge, namely to nutrition and generation. In this special case, the knowledge of animals is purely instrumental, and is a sort of anomaly. This anomaly disappears when one considers the animals as ordered to man in whom knowledge has the aspect of a term and in which the senses of knowledge (as opposed to the senses of nature) are no longer merely useful. Knowledge cannot be of itself ordered to something inferior to knowledge. Its condition is a sort of anomaly as long as "to be another" is subordinated to the obscure "to be self".

68 Morceaux choisis, pp. 232, 229, 217.

69 Since the moral person is not properly an individual substance, one cannot apply to it the definition "rationalis naturae substantia individua". The moral person is essentially common, as for instance the person of the leader as leader, or the common personality which a society constitutes. (Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., [Palme] Vol. VIII, d. 14, dub. 1, p. 23b.) The term "person" which we find in each case--moral person, physical person--is neither univocal nor analogous, but properly equivocal. The jurist who is not formally concerned with natures can place them together in a quasi-genus, "subject of rights" and "foundation of rights" which the moderns tend to confuse. Right is defined by law and law by the common good.

70 "... ut pro fine habeatur ratio status communis, quae est pernicies reipublicae bene ordinatae." J. of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., V. VII, d. 19, a. 6, n. 12, p. 694.--"Aliud habet justitia legalis ex parte boni communis, quatenus illi debet princeps bonam gubernationem, et sic oportet, quod respiciat altiorem finem quam ipsum bonum commune, scilicet Deum quod nisi respiciat gubernatio boni communis, declinabit in ratione status." Ibid., n. 16, p. 696.

71 Ibid., n. 13, p. 695.

72 Marx very clearly saw this tyrannical and alienating power of the State. But he sought the solution for it in the very logical application of Kantian personalism. According to Kant, man is an end unto himself. The ultimate end for which God creates rational creatures is the persons themselves in their proper dignity. This dignity does not come from the person by himself being able to attain to the ultimate end of the universe, that is to an end other than the person; the person receives his dignity from himself because he is his own end and accomplishes in himself the liberty of autonomy. (Fondements de la metaphysique des moeurs [second edition, trans. V. Delbos, Paris, 1929, pp. 149 et seq.]). According to Marx, every ordination to other than self damages the dignity of man, since the latter demands that man be his own source. "To be radical is to take things by the root. And the root of man is man himself." "... man is the supreme essence of man." (Morceaux choisis, p. 186-87). "Philosophy makes no secret of it: the profession of Prometheus: 'in a word, I hate all gods...' is philosophy's own profession, the discourse which it holds and will always hold against all of the gods of heaven and earth, which do not recognize the human consciousness as the highest divinity. This divinity suffers no rival." (p. 37) "Human emancipation will not be realised until the individual real man absorbs the abstract citizen, when as individual man in his empirical life, in his individual work and relations, he becomes a generic being and thus recognizes his own forces as social forces and organises them himself as such, and thus consequently he will no longer separate from himself social force in the form of political power." (p. 217) "Communism as the positive abolition of private property considered as the separation of man from himself, therefore communism as the real appropriation of the human essence by man and for man, therefore as the return of man to himself as social man, that is as human man, a complete, conscious return which maintains all the richness of anterior development. This communism, being an accomplished naturalism, coincides with humanism; it is the true end of the quarrel between existence and essence, between objectivization and affirmation of self, between liberty and necessity, between the individual and the species." (p. 229) "It is beyond this rule of necessity that the development of the powers of man begins, which development is its own end, which is the true reign of liberty, but which cannot fulfill itself except by supporting itself on this reign of necessity." (p. 234) The immortality which would make man dependent on something besides himself, which would consequently be contrary to his dignity, is itself to be "courageously" denied. And that indeed is very much in harmony with Marxist dialectic, as it is, this time, in harmony with the truth also: this dignity implies its proper negation.

73 See Appendix III, p. 108.

74 Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q. 81, a. 6; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., V. VII, d. 19, a. 6, nn. 9-18.

75 Antoine de Saint Exupery, Pilote de Guerre, Editions de la Maison Françla;aise, N.Y., p. 212.

76 Even the sin of Adam was without speculative ignorance. "Adam non est seductus, sed mulier. Seductio autem duplex est, sc. in universali, et in particulari eligibili, quae est ignorantia electionis. Quicumque ergo peccat, seducitur ignorantia electionis in particulari eligibili. Mulier autem fuit seducta ignorantia in universali, quando sc. credidit quod serpens dixit; sed vir non credidit hoc, sed deceptus fuit in particulari, sc. quod gerendus esset mos uxori, et cum ea comedere deberet, et inexpertus divinae severitatis credidit quod facile ei remitteretur." S. Thomas, In I ad Tim., c. II Lect. 3. See also In II ad Tim., ch. III. Lect. 2, on the semper discentes et numquam veritatem invenientes.

77 This work was presented to the congress of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, held in Philadelphia in 1940. It appeared, in its major substance, in the Proceedings of the Association under the title, Metaphysics and International Order. I am told that among other faults the text in the Proceedings suffers from being "enigmatically brief". This is a worthy criticism and I shall try to do better in this new version.

78 Joseph Stalin, in Histoire du parti communiste (Bolchevik) de l'U.S.S.R. Foreign language edition, Moscow, 1939, Ch. IV, section 2: "Le materialisme dialectique et le materialisme historique." This same section was published separately by International Publishers, New York, 1940.

79 "A sophista vero differt philosophus 'phronesi', idest electione vel voluptate, idest desiderio vitae." In V Metaph., Lect. 4, n. 575.

80 "For it is not appropriate to consider politics or prudence as the best of knowledge, unless man be the best of what is in the universe." VI Ethic., ch. 7, 1141a20.

81 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., ed. Solesmes V. I, p. 395.

82 Cajetan, In Iam IIae, q. 58, a. 5.

83 Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q. 47, a. 1.

84 I Metaph., c. 2, 982b25.

85 Q. D. de virt. card., a. 1, c: "... vita autem humana est quae est homini proportionata. In hoc homine autem invenitur primo quidem natura sensitiva, in qua convenit cum brutis; ratio practica, quae est homini propriasecundum suum gradum; et intellectus speculativus, qui non perfecte in homine invenitur sicut invenitur in angelis, sed secundum quamdam participationem animae. Ideo vita contemplaiva non est proprie humana, sed superhumana; vita autem voluptuosa quae inhaeret sensibilibus bonis, non est humana, sed bestialis. Vita ergo proprie humana, est vita activa, quae consistit in exercitio virtutum moralium.

86 "... prudentia est circa bona humana, sapientia autem circa ea quae sunt homine meliora." In VI Ethic., Lect. 6, d. 1191.

87 "... nos utimur omnibus quae sunt secundum artem facta, sicut propter nos existentibus. Nos enim sumus quodammodo finis omnium artificialium. In II Physic., Lect. 4, n. 8. This proposition is verified even in the case of works of religious art. For these imitations are made in order to represent the originals in a manner more proportioned to ourselves.

88 "Et dicit (Philosophus) quod ad prudentem videtur pertinere, quod sit potens ex facultate habitus bene consiliari circa propria bona et utilia, non quidem in aliquo particulari negotio puta qualia sint bona vel utilia ad sanitatem vel fortitudinem corporalem; sed circa ea quae sunt bona et utilia ad hoc quod tota humana vita sit bona ... quia scilicet illi quidem dicuntur prudentes non simpliciter, sed circa aliquid determinatum, qui possunt bene ratiocinari quae sunt bona vel utilia ad aliquem finem determinatum, dummodo ille finis sit bonus; quia ratiocinari de his quae pertinent ad malum finem est contrarium prudentiae: dummodo hoc sit circa ea quorum non est ars, quia bene ratiocinari de hoc non pertinet ad prudentiam, sed ad artem. Si ergo ille qui est bene consiliativus ad aliquid particulare est prudens particulariter in aliquo negotio; consequens est, quod ille sit totaliter et simpliciter etiam prudens, qui est bene consiliativus de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam. In VI Ethic., Lect. 4, nn. 1162-3.

89 "... manifestum est quod ars non deliberat. Nec artifex deliberat inquantum habet artem, sed inquantum deficit a certitudine artis: unde artes certissimae non deliberant. Sicut scriptor non deliberat quomodo debeat formare litteras. Et illi etiam artifices qui deliberant, postquam invenerunt certum principium artis, in exequendo non deliberant: unde citharaedus, si in tangendo quamlibet chordam deliberaret, imperitissimus videretur. Ex quo patet quod non deliberare contingit alicui agenti, non quia non agit propter finem, sed quia habet determinata media per quae agit." In II Physic., Lect. 14, n. 8.

90 "... malum numquam invenitur nisi in paucioribus, si referuntur effectu ad causas proprias: quod quidem in naturalibus patet. Nam peccatum vel malum non accidit in actione naturae, nisi propter impedimentum superveniens illi causae agenti quod quidem non est nisi in paucioribus, ut sunt monstra in natura, et alia hujusmodi. In voluntariis autem magis videtur malum esse ut in pluribus quantum ad agibilia, licet non quantum ad factibilia, inquantum ars non deficit nisi ut in paucioribus, imitatur enim naturam. In agibilibus autem, circa quae sunt virtus et vitium, est duplex appetitus movens, scilicet rationalis et sensualis; et ideo quod est bonum secundum unum appetitum, est malum secundum alterum, sicut prosequi delectabilia est bonum secundum appetitum sensibilem, qui sensualitas dicitur quamvis sit malum secundum appetitum rationis. Et quia plures sequuntur sensus quam rationem, ideo plures inveniuntur mali in hominibus quam boni. Sed tamen sequens appetitum rationis in pluribus bene se habet, et non nisi in paucioribus male." Q. D. de Pot., q. 3, a. 6, ad 5.

91 Ia Pars, q. 49, a. 3, ad 5; q. 63, a. 9, ad 1; q. 23, a. 7, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 2, ad 3.

92 In II Ethic., Lect. 7; In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4.

93 And in the article on the Renaissance, the term 'humanism' "denotes a specific bias which the forces liberated in the Renaissance took from contact with the ancient world,--the particular form assumed by human self-esteem at that epoch,--the ideal of life and civilization evolved by the modern nations. It indicates the endeavour of man to reconstitute himself as a free being, not as the thrall of theological despotism, and the peculiar assistance he derived in this effort from Greek and Roman literature, the litterae humaniores, letters leaning rather to the side of man than of divinity. In this article the Renaissance will be considered as implying a comprehensive movement of the European intellect and will toward self-emancipation, toward reassertion of the natural rights of the reason and the senses, toward the conquest of this planet as a place of human occupation, and toward the formation of regulative theories both for states and individuals differing from those of medieval times." Concerning a more general use of the term "humanism", see our remarks below, note 94.

94 Some authors use the term 'humanism' to signify a very elevated conception of the natural faculties of man. This imposition is the cause of a good many purely verbal misunderstandings. When the word is used with this broad signification, it must be said that St. Thomas is infinitely more humanist than Erasmus, indeed that he is opposed to Erasmus as to one who destroys what is best in man. The conception of humanism which is now referred to as 'vulgar,' and which is based on works such as those of Burckhardt, Monnier and Symonds cannot resist this play on words. This wider imposition can moreover find a justification in the 'vulgar' conception of humanism, which latter also played on the meaning of 'natural power' of man. It is not always warranted that one should accept this kind of slide from one meaning of a word to another. In St. Thomas, 'essence' does not mean gasoline [as it may in French--TRANS.], and in reading St. Thomas we ignore this new meaning of the word though it is not without foundation. The thesis about movement represented by those whom the so-called 'vulgar conception' called "humanists" on account of their ideas, cannot be refuted by citing passages in which Erasmus, for example, contrary to someone such as Mirandola, rebels against the so-called rationalization of the Gospel and against the philosophic Hellenism of the Middle Ages. Erasmus is profoundly humanist when he wishes to reject Aristotle, and he is still more so when he attacks scholastic theology under the pretext of defending Christian wisdom. One diminishes his genius when one tries to excuse him by citing the abuses to which decadent scholastics were given. One diminishes still further the mastery itself of a master when one maintains that his work, isolated from infinitely complex historical circumstances, is not really intelligible. He who attacks the great scholastics of the Middle Ages, he who ignores the greatest among his own contemporaries, must also, in our opinion, attack that which was most profound in Greek wisdom, i.e., that by which man can best approach Christian speculative wisdom and moral science, for that is also what is most divine in man. The naked evangelism that Erasmus preached is most humanist in the sense in which we understand the term. His doctrine is not less humanist for being called "philosophy of Christ", or for having considered the use of philosophy in theology as a form of paganism. We do not deny that there is some foundation for the enthusiasm which was later manifested on the occasion of the great scientific discoveries. What we regard as humanist is the hope that was invested in this new power. We do not deny the power of temptation; we consider as humanist the manner in which certain persons reacted, and we count them among our adversaries. Undoubtedly words signify as one pleases--ad placitum. But that should not prevent us from following this counsel of St. Thomas: "Because we should not even use terms which the unfaithful use, lest the commonness of the names become an occasion of error, the faithful should avoid readily using the word destiny, so that they will not appear to approve of those who use it according to a bad meaning." III Contra Gentiles, c. 93.

95 "Statuit tandem optimus opifex ut cui dari nihil proprium poterat commune esset quicquid privatum singulis fuerat. Igitur hominem accepit opus imaginis atque in mundi positum meditullium, sic est alloquutus. Nec certam sedem, nec propriam faciem nec munus ullum peculiare tibi dedimus O Adam, ut quam sedem quam faciem, quae munera tute optaveris, ea pro voto pro tua sententia habeas et possideas. Definita ceteris natura intra prescriptas a nobis leges cohercetur. Tu nullis angustiis cohercitus pro tuo arbitrio in cujus manu te posui tibi illam praefinies. Medium te mundi posui, ut circumspiceres inde commodius quicquid est in mundo. Nec te caelestem, neque terrenum, neque mortalem, neque immortalem fecimus, tu tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et fictor, in quam malueris tute formam effinguas. Poteris in inferiora quae sunt bruta degenerare. Poteris in superiora quae sunt divina ex tui animi sententia regenerari. O summam dei patris liberalitatem, summam et admirandam hominis foelicitatem. Cui datum id habere quod optat, id esse quod velit, bruta simul atque nascuntur id secum afferunt (ut ait Lucilius) e bulga matris quod possessura sunt. Supremi spiritus aut ab initio aut paulo mox id fuerunt quod sunt futuri in perpetuas aeternitates." Oratio Joannis Pici Mirradulae Concordiae Comitis. "Legi Patres ..."--Omnia Opera, ed. Jehan Petit, Paris 1517. s. p. Here are some passages taken from the Theologia Platonica of his teacher and friend, Marsile Ficin: "A man strives to remain in the mouths of men for the whole of the future.... He accepts that he cannot be celebrated by the entire past, by all countries, by all animals.... He measures the earth and the heaven, scrutinizes the depths of the Tartar, and the heaven does not seem to him too high, nor the center of the earth too deep.... And since he knows the order of the heavens, and who moves these heavens, and where they are moving to and their measures and their products, who will deny that he has practically the same genius as the author of these heavens and that in a certain manner he could create them himself.... Man wants to have no superior or equal; he does not tolerate in the least that there should be above him some dominion from which he might be excluded. That is the state of God only.... He strives everywhere to command, everywhere to be praised. He strives to be everywhere like God. Like God, he strives to always exist." In P. Monnier, Le Quattrocento 8th ed., Paris 1934, V. 1 pp. 49-50. Further let us quote this passage taken from the Silva of Laurence of Medici: "Talent was then equal to desire, and envy to the strength of the intellect; man contented himself to know the part of God that he can understand; and the vain presumption of our perverse mind should not rise higher, nor search with excessive preoccupation the causes that nature hides from us. "Today our mortal mind presumes that there is a hidden good to which it aspires; a vulgar subtility spurs our human desire and does not know how to restrain it; that is why our desire complains that the mind has too much light in supposing this good; and, if it does not see it, it complains of the little that it sees, and it sees that it does not see, and it seeks to be blind or to see completely." Apud Monnier, op. cit., V. II, p. 129.

96 "... poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur." In I Sent., Prol., q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.

97 Ia Pars, q. 1, a. 9.

98 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. I. Ed. E. A. Burtt, The English philosophers from Bacon to Mill, Modern Library, 1939, p. 587.

99 Even his conception of experimental physics was strictly dialectic insofar as its method was interrogative.

100 See Appendix V, p. 120.

101 In I Post. An., Lect. 1.

102 Compare this with F. C. Schiller, Hypothesis, in Studies in the History and Method of Science, ed. Charles Singer, Oxford, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 429-430.

103 Joseph Stalin, op. cit., pp. 99-100: "Dialectic comes from the Greek word 'dialego' which means converse, polemicize. In antiquity, dialectic meant the art of attaining to the truth by discovering contradictions contained in the reasoning of the adversary and overcoming them. Certain philosophers of antiquity considered the discovery of contradictions in thought and the shock of contrary opinions to be the best means of discovering the truth. This dialectic mode of thinking, extended later to the phenomena of nature, has become the dialectic method of knowing nature; according to this method, natural phenomena are eternally moving and changing, and the development of nature is the result of the development of contradictions in nature, the result of reciprocal action of contrary forces of nature."

104 "Pars autem logicae, quae demonstrativa est, etsi circa communes intentiones versetur docendo tamen usus demonstrativae scientiae non est in procedendo ex his communibus intentionibus ad aliquid ostendendum de rebus, quae sunt subjecta aliarum scientiarum. Sed hoc dialectica facit, quia ex communibus intentionibus procedit arguendo dialecticus ad ea quae sunt aliarum scientiarum, sive sint propria, sive communia, maxime tamen ad communia." In I Post. An., Lect. 20, n. 5.--Also In de Trinitate, q. 6 a. 1, c.; In IV Metaph., Lect. 4, John of Saint Thomas, Curs. Phil., (ed. Reiser) V. 1, p. 278.

105 The Logic of Hegel, trans. from the Encyclopadie by W. Wallace, London, 1892, p. 221. (This edition of Wallace contains a large number of unedited notes by Hegel.)--Friedrich Engels, likewise, finds a confirmation of this verbal negation of the principle of contradiction in the calculus, at least in the calculus as it was understood in his time. "When the mathematics of straight and curved lines arrived thus at its almost perfect development, a new and practically unlimited field opened up in mathematics which conceives the curved as straight (differential triangle) and the straight as curved (curve of the first order with infinitely small curvature). O metaphysics!" Dialectics of Nature, International Publishers, New York, 1940, p. 201. The editor of this text takes care to add the following note: "This was of course written before rigorous proofs founded on the theory of limits had been introduced in the textbooks. Engels is perfectly correct for the calculus as it was taught in his time." Note also that Engels is perfectly correct in conceiving the calculus as a result of the application of the dialectic method (usus logicae docentis) in mathematics. It suffices moreover to introduce motion into mathematics to convert the latter into dialectic, for strictly mathematical considerations are without motion. His error consisted in believing that one could in fact reach the limit.

106 Voir G.-V. Plekhanov, Les questions fondamentales du marxisme, le chapitre intitule Dialectique et logique, E. S. I., Paris, s. d., p. 97ff.

107 Joseph Stalin, op. cit., pp. 102-3.

108 V Metaph. c. 6, 1016a25, Lect. 7, n. 863; In Physic., c.14, 224a, Lect. 23, n. 13; St. Albert, In Physic. tract. III. c. 17,

109 On the negation of negation, see, F. Engels, M. E. Duhring bouleverse la science (Anti-During), V. I, Ch. XIII entitled Dialectique. Negation de la negation. Paris, Alfred Costes, 1981, pp. 198-9ff.

110 See Appendix IV, p. 109.

111 "It appears that a certain Herr Krug, supposing Hegel to be attempting in the philosophy of nature to deduce all actual existent objects from the pure Idea, enquired whether Hegel could deduce the pen with which he, Herr Krug, was writing. Hegel demolishes the unfortunate Krug in a contemptuous and sarcastic footnote, in which he states that philosophy has more important matters to concern itself with than Krug's pen. And the general position he takes up is that the philosophy of nature cannot and should not attempt to deduce particular facts and things, but only universals. It cannot deduce this plant, but only plant in general; and so on. The details of nature, he says, are governed by contingency and caprice, not by reason. They are irrational. And the irrational is just what cannot be deduced. It is most improper, he tells us, to demand of philosophy that it should deduce this particular thing, this particular man, and so forth. (... In my opinion Hegel was wrong, and Krug right, as regards the question of the pen. And Hegel's ill-tempered petulance is possibly the outcome of an uneasy feeling that Krug's attack was not without reason. If we are to have an idealistic monism it must explain everything from its first principle, thought. And that means that it must deduce everything. To leave anything outside the network of deduction, to declare anything utterly undeducible, is simply dualism.)" W. V. Stace, The philosophy of Hegel, Macmillan and Co., London 1924, para. 425, 426, p. 308. The context in which we place this footnote should not lead the reader into error--Prof. Stace is not a Marxist!

112 Joseph Stalin, op. cit., p. 100.

113 Karl Marx, Morceaux choisis, p. 197.

114 Ibid., p. 166.

115 Ibid., p. 104.

116 Ibid., p. 103.

117 Ibid., pp. 104-5.

118 Voir Plekhanov, loc. cit.

119 Marx, op. cit., p. 233.

120 Ibid., p. 222.

121 Ibid., pp. 221-3, 237.

122 Dionysius the Areopagite, Traite de la theologie mystique, Ch. III. Trans. of R. P. Dom Jean de S. Francois, Oeuvres de S. Denys Areopagite, Nicolas Buon, Paris 1629, 545, 546.

123 Marx, op. cit., p. 233.

124 "Then I saw a beast rise from the sea ..." Apoc. XIII, 1. In the Expositio II on the Apocalypse, edited among the works of St. Thomas (Vives, vol. 32), we find the following commentary: And I saw, that is interiorly, a beast, that is, a body, a crowd of perverse men living in a bestial way and cruelly devouring other men, that is, causing them either spiritual or corporeal evil.... From the sea, that is, from the world shaken by the storm of tribulations and temptations, and made bitter by its transgressions, for this beast will be formed of diverse nations of the world. Et vidi, that is by internal sight, a beast, that is, a body or numerousness of perverse men living and cruelly devouring others, namely by either spiritual or corporeal harm.... De mari, that is, from the world tempestuous from tribulations and temptations and bitter by transgression, since from diverse nations of the world this beast will be collected." (p. 298) In the Desclee edition, we read at the same place, in a note: "The four beasts of Daniel each represent an empire (vii, 17, 23); that of the Apocalypse, which has in it the characteristics of all the others (v, 2), must necessarily represent all these empires together and be the symbol of political power, of the material force of States, placed in the service of the dragon, in order to oppress the servants of God. It rises from the sea, like the four beasts of Daniel (vii, 1), because the empires arise ordinarily from wars and troubles which agitate the peoples. Then I saw rise from the earth another beast ... Apoc. XIII, 11. "From the earth: the first beast rose from the ocean, that is from the agitation and disturbance of the peoples; this one arises from the earth, a more calm element: it is born in a tranquil social state, in the heart of civilization. Another beast: all the characteristics which follow make of it the symbol of false science, of the wisdom of this world in the service of the impious. Thus is it designated further on as 'the false prophet.' " Ibid.

125 Op. cit., p. 83.

126 Ibid., pp. 186, 187.

127 The encyclical Divini Redemptoris denounces modern communism as a doctrine of false redemption: "fucata tenuiorum redemptionis specie profertur."--See the remarks of Fr. Alphonse-Marie Parent in his study entitled Autour du racisme, in L'Academie canadienne Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, 11th session (1941), pp. 113, 122-23.

128 ... non ita quod id quod est necessarium, sit sicut finis; quia id quod necessarium est, ponitur ex parte materiae sed ex parte finis ponitur ratio necessitatis. Non enim dicimus quod necessarium sit esse talem finem, quia materia talis est sed potius e converso, quia finis et forma talis futura est, necesse est materiam talem esse. Et sic necessitas ponitur ad materiam, sed ratio necessitatis ad finem." In II Physic., Lect. 15, n. 4.

129 Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums, Dritte umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage, Leipzig, Wigand, 1849. In Sammtliche Werke, V. VII.

130 See especially pp. 372ff.

131 "Aristoteles sagt bekanntlich ausdrucklich in seiner Politik, dass der Einzelne, weil er fur sich selbst nicht sich genuge, sich gerade so zum Staate verhalte, wie der Theil zum Ganzen, dass daher der Staat der Natur nach fruher sei als die Familie und das Individuum, denn das Ganze sei nothwendig frueher als der Theil.--Die Christen "opferten" wohl auch "das Individuum", d. h. hier den Einzelnen als Theil dem Ganzen, der Gattung, dem Gemeinwesen auf. Der Theil, sagt der heilige Thomas Aquino, einer der groessten christlichen Denker und Theologen, opfert sich selbst aus naturelichem Instinkt zur Erhaltung des Ganzen auf. "Jeder Theil liebt von Natur mehr das Ganze als sich selbst. Und jedes Einzelne liebt von Natur mehr das Gut seiner Gattung, als sein einzelnes Gut oder Wohl. Jedes Wesen liebt daher auf seine Weise naturgemaess Gott, als das allgemeine Gut, mehr, als sich selbst." (Summae P. I. Qu. 60. Art. V.) Die Christen denken daher in dieser Beziehung wie die Alten. Thomas A preist (de Regim. Princip. 1. III. c. 4.) die Roemer, dass sie ihr Vaterland uber alles setzten, seinem Wohl ihr Wohl aufopferten. Aber alle diese Gedanken und Gesinnungen gelten im Christenthum nur auf der Erde, nicht im Himmel, in der Moral, nicht in der Dogmatik, in der Anthropologie, nicht in der Theologie. Als Gegenstand der Theologie ist das Individuum, der Einzelne ubernaturliches, unsterbliches, selbst-genueges, absolutes, goettliches Wesen. Der heidnische Denker Aristoteles erklaert die Freundschaft (Ethik 9. B. 9. K.) fur nothwendig zur Glueckseligkeit, der christliche Denker Thomas A. aber nicht. "Nicht gehoert nothwendig, sagt er, Gesellschaft von Freunden zur Seligkeit, weil der Mensch die ganze Fuelle seiner Vollkommenheit in Gott hat." "Wenn daher auch eine Seele allein fur sich im Genusse Gottes waere, so waere sie doch selig, wenn sie gleich keinen Naechsten hatte, den sie liebte." (Prima Secundae. Qu. 4. 8.) Der Heide weiss sich also auch in der Glueckseligkeit als Einzelnen, als Individuum und desswegen als beduerftig eines andern Wesens seines Gleichen, seiner Gattung, der Christ aber bedarf keines andern Ich, weil er als Individuum zugleich nicht Individuum, sondern Gattung, allgemeines Wesen ist, weil er "die ganze Fulle seiner Vollkommenheit in Gott" d. h. in sich selbst hat." Op. cit., p. 212.

132 In Ego Sapientia (Second Part) I insisted on the perverse interpretation one could give to the doctrine of the power of the weak. I did not know then, not having yet read this work of Feuerbach in the complete text, that modern philosophy had really done this in such an elaborate way.

133 "Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit: ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum, vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam: unde Augustinus dicit, XI Super Gen. ad litt., quod menti mulieris inhaesit amor propriae potestatis. IIa IIae, q. 163, a. 2, c.

134 Where did this immense scaffolding of Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity lead to? To the exaltation of sexual sensuality, in which man-Gattung is fulfilled in a physical, concrete manner. (Op. cit., ch. 18, pp. 222 et seq.) "Religion, according to Feuerbach, is the sentimental relation of man to man which ... now finds (reality) directly and without intermediary in the love between you and me. And it is thus that sexual love becomes, finally, in Feuerbach, one of the highest forms, if not the highest form, of the exercise of his new religion." (Engels, Feuerbach, p. 35.) But Marxism too, in spite of the protesting of Engels who finds it all "disgusting" (p. 21), finally leads to an analogous Dammerung. What are goods? Material goods. What are material goods? "Nourishment, clothing, shoes, housing, fuel, instruments of production, etc." (Stalin, op. cit., p. 113).

135 Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, in Etudes philosophiques, editions sociales internationales, Paris 1935, pp. 10-11.

136 This text that Professor A. Viatte made known to me several years ago has since then been cited often, but always incompletely. The passages which are omitted are precisely those which, in my point of view, are the most important, namely the passages which directly incriminate philosophy.

137 Heinrich Heine, De l'Allemagne (1834). Paris, Calmann Levy, 1878, V.1, pp. 179-183.

138 We do not mean thereby that only natures, even natures as understood in the broad sense, are works of the Divine art. Every work of God, everything of which He is the cause, is a work of the Divine art. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt: et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est.

139 See the quotation from Marcile Ficin (note 95, p. 81).

140 It is noteworthy that in the most advanced treatises in the way of concretion, Aristotle opposes natural doctrine to the speculative sciences: "however the case may be, the mode of proof and of necessity is other in natural doctrine (physica) than in the speculative sciences." (I De Part. Animal., Ch. 1, 640a.) He also opposes this same treatise to the treatises composed "according to philosophy." (ibid., 642a5). In certain respects natural doctrine, art and prudence are likened to each other in a quasi-genus opposed to metaphysics and mathematics, according to what St. Thomas says.

141 It is also true that the relative anteriority of the absolute Idea presents difficulties of interpretation, but it remains that each category beneath the first, and each species, is transcendentally the fruit of pure becoming, of the movement of reason by means of contradiction. The impossibility of making clear the relation between the first reason and the absolute Idea makes sufficiently clear the impossibility that Hegel himself was up against.

142 Here is a passage from the book Hitler Told Me, by Hermann Rauschning (Paris, 1939):

" 'I pointed out to him that that way one arrived at Bolschevism and communism, as in Russia.'

'But no, but no,' replied Hitler, 'you're the victim of an old sophism that must be cleared up. What remains of Marxism is the will towards revolutionary construction, which no longer needs to be supported on ideological crutches, and which forges for itself an instrument of implacable power in order to impose itself on the popular masses and on the whole world. Thus from a teleology with a scientific basis there comes a true revolutionary movement, provided with all the necessary means for the conquest of power.'

'And the end of this revolutionary will?'

'There is no precise end. Nothing that is fixed once and for all. Is that too hard for you to understand?' I replied that indeed I was a bit disconcerted by these

unordinary ideas.

'We are a movement. That is the word that says all. Marxism teaches that a giant uprising will transform the world suddenly. The millennium will fall from the heavens like the new Jerusalem. After which, the history of the world is finished. There is no more development. Everything thereafter is decided. The shepherd pastures his flock. The world is at its end. But us, we know that thre is no definitive state, nothing durable, that there is a perpetual evolution. What ceases to transform itself is dead. The present is already past. But the future is the inexhaustible river of infinite possibilities for an ever new creation.' " (p. 212).

A Marxist could show that this opinion is more orthodox than one may think. "Communism," Marx wrote, "is a real phase in the emancipation and the renaissance of man, a necessary phase for the following historic evolution. Communism is the necessary form and the energetic principle of the coming future. But communism is not, as such, the end of human evolution--it is a form of human society. (Morceaux Choisis, p. 228).

143 II Physic., c. 5, 197 a 18; Lect. 9, n. 4. Also III Contra Gentiles, c. 99: "Ordo enim inditus ..." etc.